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 Essay forthcoming in 30:1 Journal of Law and Religion 136-160 (May  2015) 
 
 Corporate Conscience and the Contraceptive Mandate: A Dworkinian Reading 
 
 Linda C. McClain
*
  
 
 Introduction: “What Would Dworkin Do?” 
 
When this essay appears in print, it will be two years since the death of legal philosopher and 
constitutional law scholar Ronald Dworkin. One recurring reminder of the magnitude of that loss 
is the absence of Dworkin’s regular, insightful essays for the New York Review of Books 
analyzing significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Thus, when, last term, a closely-divided (5-
4) Court released its much-anticipated decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, upholding a 
challenge by three for-profit corporations to the contraceptive coverage provisions (the  so-called 
“contraceptive mandate”)  of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”),1 
sadly missing in the flurry of commentary was Dworkin’s assessment of the case. 2   Readers of 
this journal may perhaps appreciate the allusion when I say that the decision prompted me to 
wonder, “What would Dworkin do?”  That same question arose again when, on July 3, 2014, in 
Wheaton College v. Burwell, over a strong dissent by Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan, 
                                                 
*
Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of 
Law; Faculty Fellow, BU School of Theology, 2010-2014.  I thank M. Christian Green for her 
insightful comments and editorial suggestions, BU Law student Jessica Lees for her excellent 
research assistance on this essay, and Stefanie Weigmann, Assistant Director for Research 
Faculty Assistance, and Technology, Pappas, Law Library, for valuable help with citations. 
1
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., et al., 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
[hereinafter Hobby Lobby].  
2
 Dworkin published essays in the New York Review of Books on the constitutionality of 
ACA and on the Court’s 5-4 decision upholding it in National Federation of Independent 
Business et al v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2102), but not on ACA’s contraceptive 
coverage provisions. Ronald Dworkin, “Why the Mandate is Constitutional: The Real 
Argument,” New York Review of Books (May 10, 2012), 4-8; Ronald Dworkin, “A Bigger 
Victory Than We Knew,” New York Review of Books, August 16, 2012, 6-12.  
  
the Court granted the emergency request of Wheaton College to be relieved from complying with 
ACA’s accommodation procedure for religious nonprofit organizations who object to 
contraceptive coverage on religious grounds, even before the lower courts had ruled on the 
merits of the college’s claim.3 
 Asking “What would Dworkin do?” were he evaluating these two cases seems 
particularly apt given Dworkin’s proposal, in his final book, Religion Without God, to abandon a 
“special right to religious freedom” in favor of a “more general right to ethical independence.” 
(Religion Without God [RwG], 132).
4
 Indeed, Dworkin criticized Congress’s enactment of the 
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (“RFRA”) (RwG, 132-35),5 the statutory basis for the 
majority’s ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby’s challenge to ACA.6 Dworkin also briefly raised, but 
did not resolve, the question of what place exemptions from general laws would have in the 
reorientation he proposed. (RwG, 133-37)  
The question of exemptions is timely and pressing. On the one hand, the Hobby Lobby 
majority cited the ACA’s “accommodation for nonprofit organizations with religious objections” 
as evidence that the federal government could find a way – by extending that exemption to 
companies like Hobby Lobby – to advance its interests in women’s health without impinging on 
the religious beliefs of Hobby Lobby and similar corporations.
7
 On the other hand, the majority 
                                                 
3
Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). [hereinafter 
Wheaton College]. 
4
Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013). I 
have written a longer article evaluating that work, but raised the exemption issue only in the 
concluding pages.  Linda C. McClain, “Can Religion Without God Lead to Religious Liberty 
Without Conflict?,” 94 Boston University Law Review 1273 (2014). [hereinafter “Religious 
Liberty Without Conflict”] 
5
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a). 
6
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2754-2755. 
7
 Ibid. at 2781-2782. The other two corporations were Conestoga Wood Specialties and 
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also said that it was not deciding whether the exemption approach would, in fact, satisfy RFRA’s 
requirements.
8
 Soon after, the Court granted emergency relief to Wheaton College, which 
argued, as have numerous other religious institutions, that even filing the form certifying its 
status as a religious nonprofit and its objection to providing contraceptive services “‘makes it 
complicit in grave moral evil” by “triggering the obligation for someone else to provide the 
services to which it objects.” Wheaton College argued this substantially burdened its free 
exercise of religion under RFRA.
9
 Reading the tea leaves, Justice Sotomayor (joined by the other 
two female members of the Court) strenuously argued that granting Wheaton College that relief 
“does not square with the Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby;” further, Wheaton College’s 
substantial burden claim did not meet the “indisputably clear” standard for relief.10 Numerous 
challenges by religious nonprofit organizations to ACA’s accommodation provisions as not 
accommodating enough continue to wend their way through the federal courts.
11
 At this writing, 
three federal circuits have rejected these challenges, and the Supreme Court may eventually 
weigh in on the issue.
12
 Moreover, although the Hobby Lobby majority emphasized that the for-
                                                                                                                                                             
Mardel. Unless discussing facts specific to one corporation, this essay will refer to the three 
corporate plaintiffs as “Hobby Lobby” to avoid cumbersome references in text. 
8
Ibid. at 2782. 
9
Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2812 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Kagan). 
10
Ibid. at 2808-2809, 2813. 
11
  For example, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F.Supp.3d 
1225 (D. Colo. 2013) injunction granted 134 S.Ct. 1022 (2014) is currently pending before the 
10
th
 circuit on this issue.  There are numerous lower court decisions pending in other circuits.  
For an overview see http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral.  
12
 See Priests For Life v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., __ F.3d __, No. 13-5368, 
2014 WL 5904732, *40  (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2014) (rejecting “all of Plaintiffs’ challenges to the 
regulations”); Michigan Catholic Conference & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372 
(6th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court denial of preliminary injunction); and Univ. of Notre 
Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s denial of preliminary 
  
profit corporations before it were closely-held, family owned corporations, the dissenters 
questioned whether that distinction would make a difference in future religious freedom 
challenges brought by corporations. 
 In this essay, I will evaluate the recent Hobby Lobby litigation through the lens of 
Religion Without God’s call for a reorientation away from a special right of religious freedom to 
a general right of ethical independence. Is a corporation, for example, possessed of a right of 
ethical independence? Does it have a conscience? In Part I, I will briefly recap Dworkin’s 
proposed reorientation, focusing on Religion Without God’s brief discussion of exemptions. 
Because the Hobby Lobby litigation involved for-profit corporations, I will augment this 
discussion by recounting Dworkin’s sharp criticism13 of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
14
 in which the Court held that corporations 
were persons for purposes of exercising First Amendment rights in political campaigns and 
struck down federal laws limiting corporate spending for certain forms of political speech.  
 In Part II, bearing in mind Religion Without God’s suggested framework for handling the 
issue of exemptions, I examine some of the arguments made in briefs filed by the parties and in 
amicus briefs on both sides of the Hobby Lobby case. In Part III, I evaluate the different opinions 
in Hobby Lobby, focusing particularly on the different conclusions about whether a for-profit 
corporation has a right to the free exercise of religion. I contrast the majority’s and Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinions with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent on the idea of using the for-profit 
                                                                                                                                                             
relief).  The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in Priests for Life, 82 U.S.L.W. 
3457 (U.S. March 3, 2014) (No. 13-891) and a petition is pending in the University of Notre 
Dame case, 83 U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2014) (No. 14-392).  
13See Ronald Dworkin, “The ‘Devastating’ Decision,” New York Review of Books (Feb. 
25, 2010) 39; Ronald Dworkin, “The Decision that Threatens Democracy,” New York Review of 
Books (May 13, 2010) 63-67. 
14
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 301 (2010). 
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corporate form to live out religious beliefs. Here, I draw on Dworkin’s prior criticisms of 
Kennedy’s opinion in Citizens United and ask whether Dworkin would have been similarly 
critical of corporate personhood when a business was family-owned and closely held.  
Ginsburg’s Hobby Lobby dissent 
 “Dignity” was a central principle in Dworkin’s work;15 it is also prominent in the 
jurisprudence of Kennedy,
16
 including his Hobby Lobby concurrence. Strikingly, in explicating 
the right to ethical independence in Religion Without God, Dworkin drew on the Court’s famous 
articulation of a right to self-definition as being at “the heart of liberty,” first made in the joint 
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the context of women’s reproductive liberty and later 
repeated by Kennedy in his majority opinion Lawrence v. Texas, affirming the right of intimate 
association of gay men and lesbians. (RwG, 121-122) Dworkin sharply disagreed with 
Kennedy’s recognition of corporate personhood in Citizens United, but he would likely have 
shared the concern for women’s reproductive liberty at the core of Justice Ginsburg’s Hobby 
Lobby dissent. In Part IV, I conclude by returning to the question, “What would Dworkin do?,” 
with respect to the question Hobby Lobby did not address that is now percolating in the courts: is 
ACA’s accommodation of those with religious objections to the contraceptive mandate  not 
                                                 
15I discuss the role of dignity in several of Dworkin’s works in McClain, “Religious 
Liberty Without Conflict.”  Elsewhere, I have examined how, in Dworkin’s magisterial Justice 
for Hedgehogs (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2011), human dignity is the basic concept from 
which flow conceptions of authenticity, self-respect, and responsibility. See “Linda C. McClain, 
“Justice and Elegance for Hedgehogs – In Life, Law, and Literature,” 90 Boston University Law 
Review 862 (2010). 
16
See Linda C. McClain, “From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor: Law as a 
Vehicle for Moral Disapproval in Amendment 2 and the Defense of Marriage Act,” 20 Duke 
Journal of Gender Law & Policy 351, 463-64 (2013) (observing that one aspect of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), is his “characteristic appeal to 
‘dignity’ as he explains the injury that DOMA inflicts on lawfully married same-sex couples”). 
  
accommodating enough?  What insights does Dworkin’s work shed on what is at stake, in this 
appeal for further opt-out from the health care law, for these institutions and for women? 
 
 I. Religion Without God and Religious Accommodation 
 In Religion Without God, Dworkin enlists the principle of ethical independence to protect 
one core part of what he calls the “religious attitude” that unites believers and “religious 
atheists”—namely, the conviction that human life has “objective meaning or importance,” and 
that “each person has an innate and inescapable responsibility to try to make his life a successful 
one.” This means “living well, accepting ethical responsibilities to oneself as well as moral 
responsibilities to others . . . because it is in itself important whether we think so or not.” (RwG, 
10) Each person has an “innate, inalienable ethical responsibility to try to live as well as possible 
in his circumstances.” (RwG, 24)  This responsibility “includes a responsibility of each person to 
decide for himself ethical questions about which kinds of lives are appropriate and which would 
be degrading for him.” (RwG, 114)  Political liberty, Dworkin argues, includes this general right 
to “ethical independence,” which limits the reasons government may restrict freedom.  It “must 
never restrict freedom just because it assumes that one way for people to live their lives  . . . is 
intrinsically better than another” or assume “that one variety of religious faith is superior to 
others in truth or virtue.”  (RwG, 130, 134)  Ethical independence also protects “religious 
conviction” by “outlawing” a constraint that is neutral on its face, but “whose design covertly 
assumes some direct or indirect subordination.” (RwG, 134)  Such independence, however, does 
not bar government from “interfering with people’s chosen ways of life” for other reasons, such 
as protecting other people from harm, protecting “natural wonders,” or the general welfare. 
(RwG, 130-131)   
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 Dworkin argues that, if “we treat religious freedom as part of ethical independence, then 
the liberal position” on abortion rights, as well as on “gender equality in marriage,” becomes 
“mandatory.”17 Dworkin observes that “[o]pponents of homosexuality and abortion very often 
cite a god’s will as warrant;” by contrast, he argues, “few men or women who want choice in 
these matters conceive their desire as grounded in religion.” (RwG, 144)  A focus on ethical 
independence, in a sense, levels the playing field so that religious freedom is no longer a “special 
right” that places on government the burden of showing a “compelling” interest for any law that 
burdens religion. 
 Dworkin is, thus, critical of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act, which was “in 
effect, a declaration that religion needs more protection than general ethical independence 
offers.” (RwG, 135)  Congress enacted RFRA to reverse the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (the “peyote 
case”),18 which held that neutral laws of general application need not be subject to a compelling 
state interest test. Dworkin asserts that while RFRA was “wildly popular,” Congress was 
“wrong” as “a matter of political morality,” and the Court, in Smith, was “right.” Dworkin 
elaborates, “If we deny a special right to free exercise of religious practice, and rely only on the 
general right to ethical independence, then religions may be forced to restrict their practices so as 
to obey rational, nondiscriminatory laws that do not display less than equal concern for them.” 
(RwG, 135-136) 
 “Equal concern” is a signature Dworkin concept, dating back to Taking Rights Seriously, 
                                                 
17
 For arguments that elaborate on this “summary statement,” Dworkin directs readers to 
his other work. (RwG, 144 and n.19) 
18
494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
  
where he put forth as “postulates of political morality” that: “Government must treat those whom 
it governs with concern, that is, as human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, 
and with respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent 
conceptions of how their lives should be lived.”19 Moreover, “[g]overnment must not only treat 
people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect;” for example, it may not 
distribute “goods or opportunities’ or “constrain liberty” on the ground either that some citizens 
are “more worthy of concern” or that “one citizen’s conception of the good life of one group is 
nobler or superior to another’s.”20 Dworkin’s subsequent work developed this conception 
political morality around principles of dignity and responsibility.  
 Immediately following Religion Without God’s discussion of the obligation to obey 
general, nondiscriminatory laws that show “equal concern,” Dworkin provides a brief hint of 
how his framework might address the explosion of seeming conflicts between religious liberty 
and other rights and the question of exemptions.  Government, he says, must “notice whether any 
group regards the activity it proposes to prohibit or burden as a sacred duty,” and if so, “must 
consider whether equal concern for that group requires an exemption or other amelioration,” if 
giving one can be done “with no significant damage to the policy in play.” Contrary to what 
actually happened in Massachusetts, for example, Dworkin writes that “financing Catholic 
adoption agencies that do not accept same-sex couples as candidates, on the same terms as 
financing agencies that do, might be justified in that way, provided that enough of the latter are 
available so that neither babies nor same-sex couples seeking a baby are injured.” But Dworkin 
also argues for the “priority of nondiscriminatory collective government over private religious 
                                                 
19
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1977), 272. 
20
Ibid. at 272-273. 
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exercise” as “inevitable and right.” For example, government may refuse an exemption when 
giving one “would put people at a serious risk that it is the purpose of the law to avoid.” (RwG, 
136-137) 
 I leave for analysis elsewhere the evident clash between religious liberty and marriage 
equality, and more generally, the issue of religious accommodation as new political majorities 
expand protection of persons from discrimination based on sexual orientation.
21
 My focus here 
is how Dworkin’s framework would apply to the numerous challenges brought to ACA by 
religious institutions and, as in Hobby Lobby, even for-profit corporations? What if the “group” 
appealing to a “sacred duty” threatened by ACA’s requirements is the owner of a for-profit 
corporation? Should that corporation be eligible for accommodation? And if government is 
willing to accommodate it, suppose it then argues that even requiring it to comply with the 
process for receiving that accommodation denies it equal concern and forces it to be complicit in 
moral evil? What is at stake on the other side for female employees for whom health insurance is 
tied to employment? By what is “at stake,” I mean to include not only the issue of those 
employees’ own “ethical independence,” but also the goals the underlying laws seek to achieve, 
such as fostering women’s health, including preventive reproductive health. 
                                                 
21
Questions include:  if framed as a right to ethical independence, rather than a special 
right, does a religious person have a right to refuse goods and services to a same-sex couple 
because to do so, he or she argues, compromises the ability to define ethical values and live by 
those values? If a religious person is a public official, may he or she be free to refuse to issue a 
marriage license due to the burden on ethical independence? Might Dworkin support, as the 
Catholic Charities example suggests (RwG, 136), accommodation if providers of goods and 
services or even clerks exist in sufficient supply that LGBT persons or same-sex couples would 
not experience injury? For a sketch of how the constitutional liberalism I advance would 
approach these conflicts,  see James E. Fleming and Linda C. McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights, 
Responsibilities, and Virtues (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 146-177. 
  
 Some clues may be available from Dworkin’s sharp critique22 of Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion in Citizens United. Corporations, Dworkin insisted, “have no ideas of their 
own.” Aligning himself with Justice Stevens’s lengthy dissent, Dworkin insisted that the 
concerns for “status, dignity, and moral development” that – on some views – ground free speech 
simply do not apply to corporations.
23
  The majority’s contrary interpretation of the First 
Amendment “undermines” a basic purpose of free speech, “to protect democracy.”  Dworkin 
elaborated: “The nerve of [Justice Kennedy’s] argument – that corporations must be treated like 
real people under the First Amendment – is in my view preposterous. Corporations are legal 
fictions. They have no opinions of their own to contribute and no rights to participate with equal 
voice or vote in politics.”24 
 In a follow-up essay, Dworkin submitted that the majority’s opinion, which “repealed a 
century of American history and tradition” about limits on corporate spending on elections, 
lacked any “principled account of the First Amendment’s point.”25 Characteristic of his “moral 
reading” approach to constitutional interpretation, Dworkin insisted that the First Amendment, 
“like many of the Constitution’s most important provisions, is drafted in the abstract language of 
political morality;” therefore, interpretations by justices must by “guided by principles” – “by 
some theory of why speech deserves exemption from government regulation in principle.”  None 
of those theories, Dworkin argued, supported the majority’s decision in Citizens United, which, 
instead, inflicted “damage” on “our politics.” Dworkin reiterated that “[c]orporations have no 
ideas of their own;” instead, corporate-funded ads will “promote the opinions of their managers,” 
                                                 
22
See Dworkin, “The ‘Devastating’ Decision;” Dworkin, “The Decision that Threatens 
Democracy.” 
23Dworkin, “The Decision that Threatens Democracy,” 64. 
24Dworkin, “The ‘Devastating’ Decision,” 39. 
25Dworkin, “The Decision That Threatens Democracy,” 63. 
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using stockholder money to do so. The public may be misled by this corporate advertising 
because the volume of the ads may suggest “more public support that there actually is” for the 
opinions the ads express; in reality, “[m]any of the shareholders who will actually pay for the 
ads, who in many cases are members of pension and union funds, will hate the opinions they pay 
to advertise.”26 
 Dworkin also critiqued Citizens United through the lens of  another important theory of 
why free speech matters” – “to protect the status, dignity, and moral development of individual 
citizens as equal partners in the political process.” For that theory, Dworkin quoted Stevens’ 
observation in his Citizens United dissent that “one fundamental concern of the First Amendment 
is to ‘protec[t] the individual’s interest in self-expression.”27 Justice Kennedy attempted to enlist 
this justification on behalf of corporate free speech by arguing that “by taking the right to speak 
from some and giving it to others, . . . the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or 
class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s 
voice,” but Dworkin found this to be “bizarre,” explaining: 
The interests the First Amendment protects, on this second theory, are only the 
moral interests of individuals who would suffer frustration and indignity if they 
were censored. Only real human beings can have these emotions or suffer those 
insults. Corporations, which are only artificial legal inventions, cannot. The right 
to vote is surely at least as important a badge of equal citizenship as the right to 
speak, but not even the conservative justices have suggested that every 
corporation should have a ballot.
28
 
 
 Dworkin returns to the distinction between individuals and corporations and to who can 
possess dignity later in the essay, when he observes that: “Individuals speak and spend for 
                                                 
26
Ibid. 
27
Ibid. at 64 (quoting Citizens United, 466 (Stevens, J.) (concurring and dissenting)). 
28
Ibid. at 64. 
  
themselves, together or in association with other individuals, while corporations speak for their 
commercial interests and spend other people’s money, not their own.” Further: “Individuals have 
rights, on which their dignity and standing depend, to play a part in the nation’s government; 
corporations do not.”29 Once again, Dworkin observes, “no one thinks corporations should vote, 
and their rights to speak as institutions have been limited for over a century” – until Citizens 
United. 
 Given Dworkin’s strenuous critique of Citizens United, what would he say about Hobby 
Lobby?  Is a family-owned closely held for-profit corporation, such as Hobby Lobby, distinct 
from a publicly owned corporation? Does this distinction make a difference? Do family members 
who own such a corporation suffer frustration and indignity when ACA requires them to fund 
insurance plans for their employees that includes forms of contraception they find morally 
objectionable?  Does ACA threaten their ethical independence? If a Dworkinian approach would 
answer either of those questions yes, then should corporations like Hobby Lobby be exempt from 
ACA? Or do the interests at stake on the other side, including the ethical independence and 
reproductive health of female employees and government’s powerful interest in providing 
preventive health care for women, argue against such accommodation? Can accommodation be 
offered without “injuring” these women? And, finally, is the accommodation process itself 
forcing religious companies to be, in their view, “complicit” in evil? 
 
 II. The Hobby Lobby Briefs: Rights in Conflict? 
 In this part, I consider how the parties and friends of the court presented to the Court, in 
their legal briefs, the rights of the corporations challenging ACA, the rights and needs of the 
                                                 
29
Ibid. at 66. 
 13 
 
female employees, and the governmental interests at stake in ACA.
30
  A procedural point may be 
helpful: the owners of Hobby Lobby and of the other two corporations sued the Department of 
Health and Human Services and other federal agencies and officials under RFRA and the First 
Amendment to enjoin application of ACA’s contraceptive mandate to them with respect to four 
FDA-approved contraceptive methods that they believed “may operate after the fertilization of 
an egg.”31 The female employees of these companies were not official parties in the case; their 
interests would be affected by the lawsuit’s outcome, and so many briefs addressed those 
interests. In canvassing these briefs, I bear in mind Dworkin’s proposed shift from a special right 
to religion to a general right to ethical independence.  
Ethical independence, as explained earlier, requires that government not favor a specific 
way of life, including the religious beliefs of one group.  The shift from a special right to 
religious freedom to a more general right to ethical independence also levels the playing field. As 
applied to this conflict, female employees who wish to use certain forms of contraception may be 
exercising their ethical independence, just as their corporate employers who object to providing 
such contraceptives do so out of an ethical belief that such contraceptive methods are tantamount 
to abortion.  Protecting ethical independence requires that government leave individual citizens 
                                                 
30
All party and friend of the court briefs filed in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
(No. 13-354) and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp v. Sebelius (No. 13-356), 134 S. Ct. 678 
(2014)(granting cert.) referred to in this Essay may be found at this website:  
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/13-354-13-356.html.  Unless otherwise 
indicated, the briefs are from the “merits” phase, not on the petition for certiorari. This Essay 
samples, rather than exhaustively discusses, the 84 amicus briefs filed in Hobby Lobby. For a 
helpful website gathering and classifying these briefs, see, e.g., The Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty, “Amicus History: Hobby Lobby Amicus Briefs Among Record Levels,” 
http://www.becketfund.org/hobbylobbyamicus/.  Another useful website is 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/. 
31
 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765. 
  
to decide their way of life for themselves, rather than restricting their freedom on the assumption 
that one way is  “ intrinsically better than another” or that “people who live that way are better 
people.”  Government may, nonetheless, restrict freedom for other reasons, such as protecting 
other people from harm and advancing the general welfare. (RwG, 130-131) How does ACA 
look when measured against these requirements?  
 
In Support of Religious Free Exercise by For-profit Corporations 
 Friend of the court briefs (amicus briefs) submitted in favor of Hobby Lobby
32
 argued for 
broad and deferential protection of religious rights and sought protection for the right of 
conscientious objection. They argued that religious exercise should include “all activities or 
policies grounded in sincerely held religious beliefs,”33 and that the test for whether an activity 
constitutes a religious belief should be “whether the specific activity or policy furthers a 
sincerely held religious purpose or belief of the organization.”34 The Council for Christian 
Colleges and Universities argued that corporations can pursue profit while simultaneously 
exercising religion because protected beliefs and conduct must only “be rooted in religious 
belief.”35 So long as conduct is so motivated, then it “must be at least presumptively protected by 
the Free Exercise Clause.”36 
 Amici for Hobby Lobby also argued against a restrictive definition of “religious 
                                                 
32
 As noted earlier, I use “Hobby Lobby” here, unless otherwise specified, to refer to all 
three corporations challenging ACA. 
33
 See Brief for the Azusa Pacific University et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party at 15. 
34
 Ibid. at 19. 
35
 Brief for the Council for Christian Colleges & Universities et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Petitioners Conestoga at 10. 
36
 Brief for the Reproductive Research Audit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Hobby 
Lobby, et al., and Conestoga, et al. at 8.  
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organizations” that focused only on the relationship between houses of worship and their clergy 
members, which would exclude most religious employers like hospitals, homeless shelters, and 
schools.
37
 Moreover, they challenged the constitutional significance of the distinction between 
the for-profit and nonprofit corporate form: given that Americans “routinely exercise their 
constitutional rights in the corporate form . . . discriminating against those who choose to do so 
in the for-profit context has no constitutional foundation.”38  Prominent church-state scholar 
Michael McConnell filed a brief on behalf of the Christian Booksellers Association and other 
for-profit Christian enterprises, arguing that the understanding of the Free Exercise Clause at the 
time of the founding was that it protected “acts of religious exercise by institutions as well as 
individuals,” evidenced by the fact that,  in drafting the First Amendment, “Congress deliberately 
replaced protection for individual ‘conscience’ with the concept of free ‘exercise’ of ‘religion.'”39 
Although the “modern business corporation” had not yet come into being, “from the very 
founding of the colonies, it had been well understood that a corporate charter can combine 
religious and profitable purposes.”40 
 These briefs stressed that religion cannot be cabined, that is, “confined to the four walls 
of a church or to the private life of a believer.” 41  Rather, religious individuals will incorporate –
or integrate -- their beliefs and principles into all aspects of their personal and professional lives, 
                                                 
37
See Brief for the Association of Gospel Rescue Missions et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Granting the Petitions (for certiorari) at 16-18. 
38
 See Brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Non-
Government Parties at 3. 
39
Brief of the Christian Booksellers Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Hobby 
Lobby and Conestoga at 4-5.  
40
Ibid. at 5. 
41
 Brief for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, et al. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, et al at 11-12.  
  
including forming businesses to embody and promote the values central to their faith.
42
 Amici 
further argued that, recognizing that “an individual may ‘exercise’ religion in virtually every 
phase of life,” the Supreme Court “has declined to cabin free exercise rights to any particular 
activity.”43 
 Following from this image of infusing religion into all spheres of daily life is the 
argument that, when religious believers use the corporate form, the resulting corporate entities 
exercise an institutional conscience, and their activities should be viewed as forms of religious 
exercise.  For example, the Pacific Legal Foundation asserted that a corporation’s shareholders 
and directors “consider it important for the corporation to as an institution act in accordance with 
their moral values, just as they find a value in the institution expressing an opinion or owning 
property in its own name.”44  Charles E. Rice, a scholar of issues of constitutional law and 
morality at the University of Notre Dame, argued that a corporation or business is ultimately a 
means – a tool –  to achieve an end, and, thus, the person guiding a corporation must be 
responsible for any immoral end achieved through that corporation, just as that person would be 
responsible for the use of a gun, car, or other person.
45
 
 Hobby Lobby invoked conscience in making the same argument about responsibility for 
immorality, insisting: “the Greens cannot in good conscience direct their corporations to provide 
insurance coverage for the four drugs and devices at issue because doing so would ‘facilitate 
                                                 
42
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See Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Hobby Lobby 
Respondents and the Conestoga Petitioners, et al at 3.  
44
 Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation, Reason Foundation, and Individual Rights 
Foundation at 19. 
45
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harms against human beings.’”46 Hobby Lobby also contended that ACA’s financial penalties for 
noncompliance with the contraceptive mandate, “like threats against one’s home, bank account, 
or unemployment check – can obviously impose unbearable pressure” on its business, thus 
directly burdening the Greens’ religious exercise.47 In support of Hobby Lobby, the Thomas 
More Law Center emphasized the need to avoid the forced “sacrifice” of faith and conscience for 
livelihood, contending that “[t]he Mandate requires religiously objecting employers  . . .  to 
choose – they can follow their conscience and accept financial ruin, or they can obey the 
government and risk eternal consequences.”48 The premise of these arguments is that because 
religious belief pervades every decision of corporations like Hobby Lobby, the right to choose 
not “to use, purchase, and facilitate contraception and abortion” is essential to avoid this forced 
sacrifice. Moreover, as the Pacific Law Foundation contended, “any effort to distinguish” 
between “for profit” and “not for profit” corporations with respect to which entities “can assert 
Free Exercise rights” is “unsupportable;” rather, “individuals who participate in a corporation 
often direct their business conduct – or seek to influence corporate conduct – in accordance with 
religious values,” and, in so doing, “their corporations exercise First Amendment rights.”49  
 Amici also argued that, through ACA, government is legislating a contested and 
controversial morality. The ACA controversy presents, the Thomas More Center argued, a “clash 
between anti-discrimination principles and the First Amendment” that “is particularly volatile 
when a morally controversial practice is protected and religious persons or groups are swept 
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within the ambit of the law.” The Center asserted: “Government has no right to legislate a 
particular view of sexual morality and compel religious institutions and individuals to facilitate 
it.”50 Dworkin argues, in Religion Without God, that government  may not legislate based upon a  
view of the superiority or inferiority of particular ethical views (RwG, 130-131), but, as he 
elaborated elsewhere, government may legislate morality, that is, political morality, in ways that 
restrict freedom, subject to the requirements of equal concern and respect.
51
  Given that he 
argues that the liberal position on abortion rights “becomes mandatory” if one accepts this 
general right to ethical independence, how might a Dworkinian respond to this charge that ACA 
legislates morality? 
 Consider, in this regard, a related theme in many briefs filed in support of Hobby 
Lobby—namely, that allowing corporations to exercise their conscience through their business 
decisions is consistent with the strong American tradition of protecting conscientious objectors.
52
  
Notably, Dworkin discusses the Supreme Court precedents about conscientious objection to the 
Vietnam War in illustrating recognition of a “religious attitude” not confined to religious beliefs. 
(RwG 119-121)
53
 Amici appealed to a long history of protecting conscientious objectors to war, 
capital punishment, assisted suicide, and abortion,
54
 including, more recently, a 2012 federal 
appropriations law forbidding agencies from denying funding to health care entities that refuse to 
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provide services related to abortions.
55
 In contrast, the Brief of the Public Policy Women’s 
Groups asserted:  “By forcing conscientiously opposed individuals and organizations to 
participate in abortion, the Mandate transforms abortion ‘culture wars’ into abortion ‘conscience 
wars.’”56 In doing so, the “Mandate” prefers some women over others, advancing “the interests 
of only that subset of women who value free abortion drugs above public goods such as religious 
freedom and limited government,” while “work[ing] against the interests of those free-minded, 
independent women whose personal, moral, and political values lead them to support a different 
balance of policy considerations.
57
 
In sum, these briefs argue for a broad definition of religion and religious activity that 
allows Hobby Lobby to follow its corporate conscience. Such protection of conscience is a value 
that, implicitly, must be favored more highly than government’s interest in providing 
reproductive health care to Hobby Lobby’s female employees because, otherwise, religious 
employers risk losing their ability to live their lives and run their business most in line with their 
religious beliefs. The federal mandate to provide for certain health care services, in other words, 
must lose in this hierarchy of values. In terms of Dworkin’s ethical independence framework, 
these arguments protest government imposing a controversial “morality” on them, but fail to 
address the costs to women and their health if they prevail in insisting that Hobby Lobby and 
similar corporations must be free to exercise their conscience in the public sphere, or rather, in 
the sphere of employment and commerce. 
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In Support of Women’s Right to Reproductive Health Services  
In line with Dworkin’s concept of “ethical independence,” parties who filed friend of the 
court briefs in support of HHS (and, thus, the contraceptive mandate) argued that even assuming 
that corporations could have religious beliefs, how far government should go to protect those 
beliefs must factor in the importance of woman’s reproductive liberty and choice and the role 
access to contraception plays in that liberty.
58
  For example, the State of California filed a brief 
emphasizing the importance of women’s “personal dignity and autonomy” and professional and 
economic equality.
59
 Access to contraception is an essential health care service, amici insisted, 
and any accommodation of companies like Hobby Lobby must not be at the expense of that 
access. For example, a brief submitted by experts in foreign and comparative law argued that 
both the health of a woman and her family and a woman’s future autonomy depend upon her 
access to reproductive health services. Offering examples from other legal systems, they argued 
that protection for conscientious objectors must pair with a guarantee that patients can 
nonetheless access essential health care services.
60
 
Briefs filed in support of HHS expressed worry that the costs of accommodating Hobby 
Lobby’s religious beliefs  would be borne by its female employees, who would either be forced 
to pay the out-of-pocket costs for the excluded contraceptive methods or forgo access to them.
61
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To allow such burden-shifting, s brief filed by church-state scholars asserted, would “privilege 
religion, and the religion of the particular owners, over the rights of those who do not share those 
beliefs. Such discrimination has no place in the United States.”62 A health organization similarly 
argued that a woman’s right to choose and seek preventative health care must not be “skewed by 
the religious views of the for-profit employer providing the woman’s health coverage, which 
may deny coverage for these potentially life-saving treatments.”63 
In its brief, HHS argued that ACA did not violate RFRA, since the Green family, the 
owners of Hobby Lobby, were not required (as individuals) directly to provide health insurance 
to Hobby Lobby’s 13,000 employees. RFRA, it explained, does not prevent indirect burdens on 
religious exercise arising “when one’s money circuitously flows to support the conduct of other 
free-exercise wielding individuals who hold religious beliefs that differ from one’s own.”64 This 
formulation captures the idea that Hobby Lobby’s female employees also have – to use 
Dworkin’s frame – a right to ethical independence, and exercising it may require access to 
contraception. Amici supporting HHS agreed with its reading of RFRA, stressing that ACA, in 
requiring that insurance be made available, was not “taking sides” in favor of or promoting its 
use. As Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. explained,  “[i]nstead of endorsing or 
promoting any particular choice of treatment for particular health conditions, inclusion of 
coverage for multiple care options simply allows employees to pursue wellness with medical 
guidance based on individual needs, past experiences, and their own life goals.”65 
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This formulation links health and wellness to a woman’s broader view of how to exercise 
her responsibility to live her life well. (RwG, 2)  Dworkin argues that a “paradigm” religious 
value uniting believers and “religious atheists” is that “it matters objectively how a human life 
goes and . . . everyone has an innate, inalienable ethical responsibility to try to live as well as 
possible in his circumstances.” (RwG, 24) The problem with this Dworkinian argument, from the 
perspective of Hobby Lobby and its supporters, is that precisely because it matters how a human 
life goes, once begun, an employer opposed to contraception who provides wages that may be 
used to pay for abortifacients has enabled an immoral outcome. Professor Rice, thus, asserted 
that, while “[i]t is not reasonable to say that an employer who pays his employees wages has any 
specific intent regarding how the employees spend those wages,” “it is . . . reasonable to say that 
the employer who provides a means to pay specifically for abortifacients is acting specifically to 
assist his employees to pay for, and thus obtain, abortifacients” and has an “intent” to enable 
them doing so.
66
 
Briefs filed in support of HHS offered two lines of argument that respond to this idea of 
corporate responsibility. First, they insisted that protecting employees’ conscience and faith 
required limits to the reach of an employer’s control. Thus, the Brief of Religious Organizations 
asserted: 
Just as an employer may not control how employees use their 
wages, an employer may not supervise employees’ use of their 
health-benefits compensation…[w]hether to buy or use birth 
control is an employee’s own decision, using her own 
compensation, in consultation with her own physician, and guided 
by her own religious beliefs.
67
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The emphasis, in this quoted passage, on the female employee as decision maker echoes the 
Supreme Court’s formulation of the constitutional protection of a woman’s right to decide 
whether to terminate her pregnancy, in consultation with her physician,
68
  and, as we shall see, 
also features in Justice Ginsburg’s Hobby Lobby dissent. As with the abortion debate, some 
women supporting Hobby Lobby challenged the premise that contraceptive access is an 
indispensable element of women’s health and equality.  Thus, a brief submitted by law professor 
Helen Alvaré, a prominent critic of the right to abortion, on behalf of Women Speak for 
Themselves asserted: “To agree with HHS that contraception and ECs [emergency 
contraceptives] are indispensable to women’s equality is to deny that society could find another 
way to assure respect for women’s innate equality while simultaneously accommodating their 
aspirations both to be mothers and to be economically and politically integrated into society.”69 
This group charged that it is “demeaning to women to suggest that women’s fertility and their 
bearing and rearing of children, are ‘barriers’” to women’s opportunity and workplace 
participation.
70
 
A second argument supporters of ACA made about corporate responsibility was that 
certain consequences flow from the decision by religiously-motivated, for-profit corporations to 
participate in the market and commercial activity, including compliance with laws like ACA. 
Some briefs framed this in terms of the collision between employer conscience and employee-
protective laws:  “When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter 
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of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not 
to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”71  
In sum, arguments in favor of HHS insisted that Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise rights 
should not outweigh women’s access to reproductive health care services. Relating this back to 
Dworkin’s proposed frame of ethical independence, the case for ACA’s mandate would stress 
that government is not restricting Hobby Lobby’s freedom out of a view that “one conception of 
how to live, of what makes a successful life, is superior to others,” but out of a conviction that 
providing employees access to a full range of preventive health services, including contraception, 
is essential to promoting health. The policy leaves the choice whether to use contraception in the 
hands of individual women.  Hobby Lobby’s supporters, nonetheless, would counter that the 
view that contraception is a component of health care prefers certain ethical views over others, 
but Dworkin, most likely, would argue that ACA protects ethical independence by not 
withholding or compelling use of contraception, but leaving it to individual employee choice. 
Central themes in Dworkin’s legal and political philosophy are the hedgehog’s “value 
holism” and integration.72 Thus, he insisted that people cannot readily leave their deepest 
convictions behind when they enter into the political realm.
73
 Might he, given these 
commitments, be sympathetic to the argument that when religious people enter the market, they 
wish their business practices to reflect their deepest values?  If Dworkin accepted this rejection 
of a limited sphere for exercising religion – or living out one’s view of what makes for a 
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successful life -- and found persuasive the argument that Hobby Lobby’s participation in ACA 
made its owners complicit in immorality, his framework would support accommodation “if an 
exception can be managed with no significant damage to the policy in play.”74 As it turns out, the 
Supreme Court made precisely this assumption about accommodation in ruling for Hobby 
Lobby, even as it did not reach the question of whether the accommodation provision was itself a 
threat to religious liberty under RFRA.  
 
III. The Hobby Lobby Opinions: On Corporate Conscience and Women’s 
Reproductive Health 
The legal commentary on Hobby Lobby is already extensive.
75
 My focus here is limited 
to considering how the various opinions by member of the Court fare when examined through 
the lens of Dworkin’s proposed shift from a special right to religious freedom to a more general 
right to ethical independence. Does a corporation have such a general right? If so, how far should 
that right be protected? Themes articulated in the party and amicus briefs, discussed in Part II, 
appear in the various opinions. Left unaddressed in Hobby Lobby is the question wending its way 
through the lower federal courts and which the Court may ultimately address:  whether the 
accommodation that ACA affords religious institutions survives under RFRA.
76
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The Hobby Lobby Majority: A For Profit Corporation Has Free Exercise Rights  
To begin with the conclusion: a five-member majority of the Court, in an opinion written 
by Justice Alito, holds that ACA’s requirement that “three closely held corporations provide 
health-insurance coverage for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely held religious 
beliefs of the companies owners” violates RFRA, “which prohibits the Federal Government from 
taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise of religion unless that action constitutes 
the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest.”77 For purposes of its 
analysis, the Court assumes (while expressing some doubt) that the government did have a 
compelling interest in guaranteeing that all women have access to all FDA-approved 
contraceptives without cost sharing, including the four challenged contraceptive methods.
78
 The 
flaw under RFRA, the Court holds, was that the federal government could have furthered this 
end in a “less restrictive” way: by offering Hobby Lobby the accommodation it offers “nonprofit 
organizations with religious objection.” Under the federal regulations, if an organization certifies 
that it “opposed providing coverage for particular contraceptives services,” then the 
organization’s insurer or third party administrator “must ‘[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive 
coverage from the group health insurance coverage provided in connection with the group health 
plan’ and ‘[p]rovide separate payments for any contraceptive services required to be covered’ 
without imposing ‘any cost-sharing requirements . . . on the eligible organization, the group 
health plan, or plan participants or beneficiaries.’”79 
The real action in the Court’s opinion is its conclusion that RFRA protects for-profit 
corporations and that ACA’s requirements constitute a substantial burden on their religious 
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exercise.  Since Dworkin believed RFRA was wrong as a matter of political morality, he would 
likely be critical of the Court’s reliance on it.  Further, given his emphatic disagreement with the 
Court’s ruling, in Citizens United, that for-profit corporations are “persons” possessed of First 
Amendment rights of free speech, he would likely be sharply critical of the Hobby Lobby 
majority’s expansive reading of RFRA to protect free exercise rights of such corporations. Does 
the fact that Hobby Lobby and the other companies before the Court were family-owned and 
closely-held, rather than public, make a difference? Can such corporations have a conscience? 
The majority, in effect, dissolves the corporate form to reach the devout Christian people 
behind it, telling the story of Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and their three sons, “devout members 
of the Mennonite Church,” who began what grew to be the Conestoga Wood Specialties. So, too, 
it traces the origins of Hobby Lobby to David and Barbara Green and their three children, 
“Christians” who first started out with one arts-and-crafts store that has grown “into a nationwide 
chain” of 500 stores and 13,000 employees.80 Both families seek to conduct business in ways 
that reflect their religious commitments, the majority observes, quoting Hobby Lobby’s 
statement of purpose committing the Greens to “[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating 
the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles” and the Hahns’ belief that “they are 
required to run their business ‘in accordance with their religious beliefs and moral principles.’”81 
Thus, the Conestoga board adopted a “Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life,” asserting that 
“human life begins at conception” and that it is “against [their] moral conviction to be involved 
in the termination of life” after conception, which is a “sin against God to which they are held 
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accountable.”82 So, too, the Greens believe life begins at conception and that “it would violate 
their religion to facilitate access to” the four contraceptive methods at issue since they “operate 
after [the] point” when life begins.83 
The majority reasons, thus, that  when RFRA and the First Amendment protect “the free-
exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby [and] Conestoga,” they  protect “the religious 
liberty of the humans who own and control these companies” or are “ associated with a 
corporation in one way or another.” A corporation is simply a “fiction to provide protection for 
human beings,” a “form of organization” used by “human beings” to achieve certain ends. 
Separate from the human beings who “own, run, and are employed by them,” the Court sums up, 
corporations “cannot do anything at all.”84 Strikingly, this vision of the corporation includes not 
only the owners but the employees – whose rights under ACA were at issue in the case. By 
analogy to Citizens United, Dworkin would likely have agreed with Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, 
that such employees may not share their employers’ religious vision and yet are, in effect, bound 
by it. 
The majority rejects the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit corporations, with 
respect to the “principle” the dissent argued undergirded protecting the religious “autonomy” of 
the nonprofit corporation: that such protection “often furthers individual religious freedom as 
well”; it contended that principle applies equally to for-profit corporations.85 The fact that a for-
profit corporation makes money does not mean it cannot have other purposes, the Court argues, 
pointing to how for-profit corporations support “a wide variety of charitable causes” and also 
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“further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives” through choices about how to operate. Why 
not, then, include furthering religious values and beliefs among those other “worthy” 
objectives?
86
 The majority fends off HHS’s argument that Congress could not have intended 
RFRA to apply to for-profit corporations, given the difficulty of determining the “sincere 
‘beliefs’ of a corporation,” short of “divisive, polarizing proxy battles over the religious identity 
of large, publicly traded corporation such as IBM or General Electric.”87 The majority states that 
there is no precedent of a publicly-traded corporation asserting RFRA claims, and it seems 
“improbable” that, in such a corporation, “unrelated shareholders – including institutional 
investors with their own set of stakeholders – would agree to run a corporation under the same 
religious beliefs.” Before it, the majority stresses, were three closely held corporations, owned 
and controlled by members of a single family, the sincerity of whose religious beliefs was not in 
dispute.
88
  It was precisely this mixture of stakeholders in a large public corporation that 
Dworkin emphasized as a reason not to recognize corporations as persons with free speech 
rights, since that speech would likely reflect only the views of the managers, and some in that 
that complex mix would “hate” the speech.89 Dworkin might answer  the majority that, while the 
sincere beliefs of the corporate owners of a for-profit closely held corporations were not at odds 
with those of their shareholders, they might well be at odds with their employees, who wish 
access to the contraceptives the owners find morally objectionable.    
Turning briefly to the issue of burden, the majority rejects HHS’s argument that the link 
between requiring the health insurance and the morally objectionable act – a woman employing a 
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method of contraception that destroyed an embryo – was too attenuated to burden religious 
exercise.
90
 The Court observes that the corporate owners’ belief that HHS’s rules would involve 
them in immorality raised a “difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy” 
– “the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in 
itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by 
another.”91 The majority insists that it was not the province of HHS or the Court to resolve this 
question or tell plaintiffs “their beliefs” about the correct answer are “flawed.” Instead, the 
relevant point is that, given their convictions that ACA’s requirements violate their beliefs and 
that the only alternative – providing health care consistent with their beliefs – would involve a 
financial penalty, there is a substantial burden on religious exercise.  HHS could avoid that 
burden, the majority concludes, by extending to these for profit companies the same exemption it 
provides to nonprofit religious institutions.
92
 What would Dworkin do, using an ethical 
independence frame,  in evaluating the majority’s putting to the side the “difficult” question of 
“religion and moral philosophy” and focusing instead on the ease of accommodating Hobby 
Lobby and relieving the “substantial” burden on its free exercise? He would likely find that 
Congress’s reasons for enacting the contraceptive mandate – ensuring women’s access to 
preventive health care – did not violate employers’ ethical independence. If  he accepted the 
proposition that that mandate nonetheless burdened what Hobby Lobby’s owners felt was a 
“sacred duty,” then he would likely consider whether “equal concern” for them required an 
exemption if it could be managed “with no significant damage to the policy in play,” (RwG, 
136),  an “if” about which Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, expresses doubt.   
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Dignity, Self-Definition, and the For-Profit Corporation 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion is striking not only for its characteristic appeal to 
“dignity – also a central theme in Dworkin’s work – but also for its conception of the spheres in 
which religious persons seek to live out their religious beliefs. In Religion Without God, Dworkin 
challenges the idea that a particular account of divine creation (the “science” part of religion) 
tells us anything about the best way to live (the “value” part of religion). (RwG, 24-25)  Many 
religious people and traditions, I have argued elsewhere, will disagree with his distinction, 
instead viewing the existence and work of a divine creator as highly relevant to the source and 
content of religious norms and laws and how to live life well.
93
 Thus, Justice Kennedy also 
connects the two, arguing: “In our constitutional tradition, freedom means that all persons have 
the right to believe or strive to believe in a divine creator and a divine law. For those who choose 
this course, free exercise is essential in preserving their own dignity and in striving for a self-
definition shaped by their religious precepts.”94  
Kennedy further argues, “Free exercise . . . implicates more than just freedom of belief. . . 
. It means, too, the right to express those beliefs and to establish one’s religious (or nonreligious) 
self-definition in the political, civic, and economic life of our larger community.”95 Kennedy’s 
language here resonates with Dworkin’s emphasis on dignity, self-definition, and the integration 
of all our convictions with the exercise of our responsibility to live lives well. Self-definition, 
Kennedy insists, takes place in all the different spaces of society; this passage resonates with 
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arguments by religion scholars and religious leaders (and Hobby Lobby’s amici) who argue 
against marginalizing religious people by confining the proper exercise of religion to a church or 
synagogue.  And yet, Kennedy continues, in a “complex society,” where government regulation 
is “pervasive,” “defining the proper realm for free exercise can be difficult.”96 Here, as the 
majority assumes, the regulation at issue “furthers a legitimate and compelling interest in the 
health of female employees.” The problem, Kennedy concludes – echoing the majority opinion – 
is that HHS could still achieve this end without burdening religious liberty by accommodating 
these for-profit companies. Kennedy insists that RFRA does not support “distinguishing between 
different religious believers – burdening one while accommodating the other- when it may treat 
both equally by offering both of team the same accommodation.”97  
What would Dworkin say about this appeal to equal treatment of religious believers, or, 
to use his frame, of persons exercising their right to ethical independence?  Given his sharp 
critique of Kennedy’s recognition of corporate personhood in Citizens United, would he support 
treating for profit corporations as the same, for purposes of religious exercise, as not for profits? 
Religion Without God suggests accommodating religious entities would be appropriate, in certain 
circumstances; would that apply to Hobby Lobby? Dworkin, recall, argued that, in a case where 
providing an exemption would “put people at a serious risk of harm that it is the purpose of the 
law to avoid,” refusing an exemption “does not deny equal concern.” Rather, this “priority” of 
“nondiscriminatory collective government over private religious exercise seems inevitable and 
right.” (RwG, 136-137)  
What, then, might Dworkin make of Kennedy’s argument that attempts to balance the 
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interests at stake? On the one hand, Kennedy states, “among the reasons that the United States is 
so open, so tolerant, and so free is that no person may be restricted or demeaned by government 
for exercising his or her religion.” On the other hand, “neither may that same exercise unduly 
restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their own interests, interests the law 
deems compelling.” Dworkin might well support this formulation. Then Kennedy concludes that 
these two priorities may be “reconciled” through “the existing accommodation the Government 
has designed, identified, and used for circumstances closely parallel to those presented here” – 
the exemption process made available to not for profit religious institutions. Would Dworkin 
support this conclusion? If he did, would he, nonetheless, be wary of the majority’s caveat that, 
in proffering the accommodation provision as a less restrictive alternative, it was not ruling on 
whether that accommodation would survive review under RFRA? The dissent advances our 
understanding of those, and other, issues. 
 
Health Care Choice Must be in the Hands of Women 
In a lengthy dissent joined by justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan, Justice Ginsburg 
vigorously objects to the majority’s expansive reading of RFRA and its disregard of the line 
between profit and not for profit corporations.
98
  The “startling breadth” of the majority’s 
decision, she begins, “holds that commercial enterprises, including corporations, along with 
partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge 
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incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.”99 Given Dworkin’s argument that, if one 
accepts a general right to ethical independence, the “liberal position” on the constitutional right 
to early abortion becomes “mandatory,” it is notable that Ginsburg leads with the famous 
language from the Planned Parenthood v. Casey joint opinion (of which Kennedy was a co-
author) that: “‘The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the 
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.’”100 With this 
framing, the dissent’s narrative is not about devout business owners, but about  how Congress 
remedied a “large gap” in ACA’s coverage – “preventive services that ‘many women’s health 
advocates and medical professionals believe are critically important’” – through introduction and 
passage of the Women’s Health Amendment.101 Ginsburg details that subsequent coverage in 
ACA grew out of recommendations of a group of independent experts convened by the Institute 
of Medicine; the report “noted the disproportionate burden women carried for comprehensive 
health services and the adverse health consequences of excluding contraception from preventive 
care available to employees without cost sharing.”102 
Another significant part of Ginsburg’s recounting  of how ACA came to include such 
preventive health care for women is the unsuccessful effort to include a “so-called ‘conscience 
amendment,’ which would have enabled any employer or insurance provider to deny coverage 
based on its asserted ‘religious beliefs or moral convictions.’” Salient for Dworkin’s broader 
reading of protection of ethical independence, Ginsburg observes in a footnote: “Separating 
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moral convictions from religious beliefs would be of questionable legitimacy.”103 In rejecting 
this “conscience amendment,” Ginsburg argues, Congress “left health care decisions – including 
the choice among contraceptive methods – in the hands of women, with the aid of their health 
care providers.”104 Intentionally or not, Ginsburg references the classic “who decides?” argument 
for women’s reproductive liberty, but in this instance the choice is between women and their 
religious employers or insurers rather than between women and the state. 
How to resolve the conflict between female employees and their employers is a focus of 
Ginsburg’s analysis of Hobby Lobby’s claim, first under existing Free Exercise jurisprudence 
(Smith) and then under RFRA. Under Smith, ACA’s contraceptive coverage requirement is a 
generally applicable law that “trains on women’s wellbeing, not on the exercise of religion,” and 
its effect, if any, on such exercise, is “incidental.”105 Even without Smith, she argues:  
“Accommodations to religious beliefs or observances . . . must not significantly impinge on the 
interests of third parties;”  the exemptions sought here would do so by “deny[ing] legions of 
women who do not hold their employers’ religious beliefs access to contraceptive coverage that 
the ACA would otherwise secure.”  Ginsburg observes that, “[w]ith respect to free exercise 
claims no less than free speech claims, ‘[y]our right to swing your arms ends just where the other 
man’s nose begins.’”106  
This analogy between free speech and free exercise is apt. As with Citizens United, 
protecting First Amendment rights of corporations comes at the expense of persons connected to 
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the corporation who do not share the beliefs of the corporate managers – in this case the female 
employees who have different convictions about the use of certain contraceptive methods. 
Rejecting the Court’s RFRA analysis, Ginsburg strenuously insists that the correct answer to the 
question, “Do for-profit corporations rank among ‘person[s]’ [under RFRA] who ‘exercise . . . 
religion,’” must be no.107 Invoking Justice Stevens’ partial dissent in Citizens United (which 
Dworkin, too, found so persuasive), she asserts: “Corporations . . . ‘have no consciences, no 
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.’”108 Her analysis differentiates the spheres and 
manner in which religion may be exercised. Thus, the “shelter” that the Free Exercise Clause 
affords “churches and other nonprofit religion-based organizations” often furthers “individual 
religious freedom as well” because “[f]or many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in 
large measure from participation in a larger religious community.”109 In contrast to the Court’s 
“special solicitude” for the “rights of religious organizations,” there has been – appropriately – 
no comparable “solicitude” for “commercial organizations” and “religious exemptions had never 
been extended to any entity operating in the ‘commercial, profit-making world.’”110 The logic for 
this distinction, Justice Ginsburg insists, relates to the respective purposes and compositions of 
religious organizations – “to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious 
faith” — and for-profit corporations – “workers who sustain the operations of those corporations 
commonly are not drawn from one religious community.” Indeed, federal antidiscrimination law 
does not permit a for-profit corporation to use “religion-based criterion” to restrict its work force. 
While “religious organizations exist to serve a community of believers,” for-profit corporations 
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employ “‘labor to make a profit,’ rather than to ‘perpetuate [the] religious value[s] shared by a 
community of believers.’”111 
But even assuming Hobby Lobby and Conestoga are “persons” under RFRA, Justice 
Ginsburg argues that ACA’s requirements do not “substantially burden” their religious exercise 
because the “connection between the families’ religious objections and the contraceptive 
coverage requirement is too attenuated.”112 Requiring companies to “direct money into 
undifferentiated funds that finance a wide variety of benefits under comprehensive health plans” 
does not require these companies to “purchase or provide” the objectionable contraceptives; it is 
the “covered employees” who decide whether to “claim benefits under the plan.”113 Certainly, 
employees who share their employers’ religious beliefs are “under no compulsion to use the 
contraceptives in question.” By the same token, an individual employee who, informed by her 
physician, decides to use contraception covered by the plan is making an “autonomous choice” 
that is not “in any meaningful sense” Hobby Lobby’s decision.114 Here Ginsburg invokes 
autonomous choice to emphasize the interruption of any linkage between the corporations and 
the contraceptive use, while earlier she emphasized the choice must be the woman’s to make. 
Again arguing in the alternative, Ginsburg asserts that, even if the corporations meet the 
“substantial burden” requirement, the federal government’s interests in “public health and 
women’s well being” are “compelling:” 
[T]he mandated contraceptive coverage enables women to avoid 
the health problems unintended pregnancies may visit on them and 
their children . . . . helps safeguard the health of women for whom 
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pregnancy may be hazardous, even life threatening . . . . and 
secures benefits wholly unrelated to pregnancy, preventing certain 
cancers, menstrual disorders, and pelvic pain.
115
 
 
She adds that the fact that the corporations object to “only 4 of the 20 FDA-approved 
contraceptives” does not make government’s interests less compelling; IUDs, for example, are 
“significantly more effective, and significantly more expensive than other contraceptive 
methods” – “nearly the equivalent to a month’s full-time pay for workers earning the minimum 
wage.”116 
Given these compelling interests, Ginsburg reiterates that the Court must consider the 
burden accommodating Hobby Lobby and Conestoga would pose for their employees, adding 
that: “no tradition, and no prior decision under RFRA, allows a religion-based exemption when 
the accommodation would be harmful to others – here, the very persons the contraceptive 
coverage requirement was designed to protect.”117 Again, Ginsburg returns to a clash or rights or 
collision of liberties analysis: limitations on religious freedom “‘begin to operate whenever 
activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public.’”118 Dworkin, recall, 
argues that it is does not violate equal concern to refuse an exemption where granting it would 
“put people at a serious risk that it is the purpose of the law to avoid,” because this “priority of 
nondiscriminatory collective government over private religious exercise seems inevitable and 
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right.” (RwG, 136-137). 
Critical of the majority’s holding that “the contraceptive coverage requirement fails to 
satisfy RFRA’s least restrictive means test,” Ginsburg counters that the federal government has 
shown “that there is no less restrictive, equally effective” alternative that would provide 
insurance coverage for the contested contraceptive methods and ensure that women receive them 
“at no cost to them.”119 Once again, Ginsburg uses a clash of liberties or conflict of rights 
analysis, drawing on prior Supreme Court precedents to insist that “one person’s right to free 
exercise must be kept in harmony with the rights of her fellow citizens, and ‘some religious 
practices [must] yield to the common good.’”120 As applied to the present context: “A ‘least 
restrictive means’ cannot require employees to relinquish benefits accorded to them by federal 
law in order to ensure that their commercial employers can adhere undeservedly to their religious 
tenets.”121 Ginsburg criticizes the two alternatives the Court puts forth: first, it floats the idea that 
the federal government could “assume the cost” of providing coverage, and second, it concludes 
that the government can simply offer for-profit corporations with religious objections the 
accommodation already provided to religious institutions. With respect to the latter, she astutely 
points out the Court “hedges” on this “proposal,” since it does not decide “today” whether the 
very approach it says would provide a less restrictive alterative “complies with RFRA.”122 Nor, 
for example, would counsel for Hobby Lobby commit to whether that “accommodation” was 
“acceptable.” As Ginsburg observes, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga “barely addressed” this 
possible solution, perhaps because religious nonprofit organizations were already challenging the 
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adequacy of the accommodation.
123
 
In her conclusion, Ginsburg returns to the premise that the context of commercial activity 
matters in determining the scope of religious exercise.  Drawing upon the Court’s “pre-Smith” 
jurisprudence that, she argues, “RFRA preserved,” she highlights “two key points” that should 
apply to the instant case.  First, “‘When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial 
activity as a matter of choice . . . the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of 
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on statutory schemes which are binding on 
others in that activity.” Second, “allowing a religion-based exemption to a commercial employer 
would ‘operat[e] to impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.’”124 She translates: 
“the Greens and Hahns and all who share their beliefs may decline to acquire for themselves the 
contraception in question,” but “[w]orking for Hobby Lobby or Conestoga . . . should not 
deprive employees of the preventive care available to workers at the shop next door” – certainly, 
she adds, not as a result of a judicial ruling, rather than clear guidance from the legislative or 
executive branch.
125
 I believe Dworkin would likely concur with this part of Ginsburg’s analysis, 
given his concerns over the consequences of Citizens United’s recognizing corporate personhood 
and his insistence of the “priority” of “nondiscriminatory general government.” (RwG, 137) 
Ginsburg ends by observing that Hobby Lobby and Conestoga “do not stand alone as 
commercial enterprises seeking exemptions from generally applicable laws on the basis of their 
religious beliefs.”  She illustrates with historical examples as well as present-day ones, such as 
the widely-discussed case of Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, in which a “for-profit 
photography business owned by a husband and wife refused to photograph a lesbian couple’s 
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commitment ceremony based on the religious beliefs of the company’s owners.”126 To avoid 
venturing into a “minefield” of future RFRA claims by for-profit corporations based on ACA or 
other statutory schemes, Ginsburg urges that religious exemptions under RFRA be confined to 
“organizations formed ‘for a religious purpose,’ ‘engage[d] primarily in carrying out that 
religious purpose,’ and not ‘engaged in the exchange of goods and services for money beyond 
nominal amounts.’”127 
 
What Would Dworkin Do? 
To return to this essay’s opening question, “What would Dworkin do?,” if writing about 
Hobby Lobby, there are reasons to conclude that, as with Citizens United, he would write 
critically about the flaws of the majority opinion. Just as he found Justice Stevens’ partial dissent 
in that Citizens United more persuasive, it is likely he would praise features of Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent in Hobby Lobby. Dworkin might reject any distinction between public and privately-
owned corporations, insisting that corporations – as artificial creations – had no ethical 
independence.  But if he did accept that distinction, then, applying the ethical independence 
frame would certainly support treating the rights and interests of for profit corporations’ 
employees in reproductive self-determination at least as seriously as the religious convictions of 
the corporations’ owners. If such for-profit corporations, then, might warrant accommodation, a 
Dworkinian analysis would turn, much as Ginsburg’s dissent argued, on whether such 
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accommodation could be done without injury to the public purposes advanced by the law and to 
the rights and interests of the third parties affected by the accommodation. 
  
IV. Unfinished Business: Is Accommodation Accommodating Enough?  
If Dworkin were evaluating the likely import of Hobby Lobby for future challenges to 
ACA, perhaps like Ginsburg and other dissenters, he might have alerted readers that what the 
majority in Hobby Lobby seemed to give --- female employees could obtain contraceptive 
coverage without burdening their employers by using the exemption process – it might well take 
away, since it declined to reach the issue of whether the exemption provisions satisfied RFRA.  
Indeed, the proverbial other shoe dropped just a few months after Hobby Lobby, when the Court 
took the unusual step of granting an application of Wheaton College, a nonprofit liberal arts 
college, to enjoin the federal government from enforcing the exemption provisions against it, 
even before there was a lower court ruling on its legal challenge that the exemption violates its 
free exercise of religion under RFRA.
128
 Wheaton College was clearly eligible for the religious-
nonprofit exemption, but objected to having to undertake the exemption process itself, which 
required that it sign a form “certifying that it is a religious nonprofit that objects to the provision 
of contraceptive services,” and provide “a copy of that form to its insurance issuer or third-party 
administrator.”129  It argued that this made it “complicit in grave moral evil,” since it was 
“religiously opposed to emergency contraceptives because they may act by killing a human 
embryo.”  This argument, readers should appreciate, is made by numerous Catholic nonprofits 
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challenging ACA with respect to all forms of contraception and sterilization.
130
 The majority of 
the Court gave that emergency relief over a lengthy dissent by Justice Sotomayor, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan (perhaps not coincidentally the three female members of the 
Court). 
Sotomayor argued that granting such emergency injunctive relief was “as rare as it as 
extreme,” and also inappropriate in the instant case, where “no one could credibly claim 
Wheaton’s right to relief is indisputably clear.”131 The dissent also castigated the majority for its 
retreat from the position in Hobby Lobby that ACA’s accommodation provision was a way to 
protect religious liberty while ensuring contraceptive access, asserting: “Those who are bound by 
our decisions usually believe they can take us at our word. Not so today.”132 
 Sotomayor also spoke critically of the merits of Wheaton College’s claim, asserting that 
its argument that simply filing a “self-certification form will make it complicit in the provision of 
contraceptives by triggering the obligation for someone else to provide the services to which it 
objects” was not viable.133 This accommodation process is “the least restrictive means of 
furthering the Government’s compelling interests in public health and women’s well-being.”134 
Invoking Ginsburg’s Hobby Lobby dissent, Sotomayor emphasized that  it is courts that  must 
decide which religious burdens are too substantial to be borne, not the affected religious 
organizations (such as Wheaton College);  simply “thinking one’s religious beliefs are 
                                                 
130
 Priests for Life, 2014 WL 5904732, *1 (quoting Catholic doctrine that contraception is 
a “grave sin”); Little Sisters of the Poor, 6 F.Supp.3d at 1128 (reporting testimony that all forms 
of contraception are “gravely contrary to moral law” and “intrinsic evils”). 
131
Wheaton College, 134 S.Ct. at 2808. 
132
 Ibid. 
133
 Ibid. at 2809. 
134
 Ibid. 
  
substantially burdened – no matter how sincere or genuine that belief may be – does not make it 
so.”135 Therefore, although Wheaton may be troubled by the fact that it must participate in a 
larger process that results in providing contraceptives to its employees, this is not sufficient to 
constitute a substantial burden on its free exercise of religion.  
To help explain “why Wheaton’s complicity theory cannot be legally sound,” Sotomayor 
employed an analogy used by the Seventh Circuit in its rejection of the University of Notre 
Dame’s similar claim.136 If, during wartime, “there is a draft, and a Quaker is called up” and 
“tells the selective service system that he’s a conscientious objector,” suppose, on being told 
“’you know this means we’ll have to draft someone in place of you,.” he “replies indignantly that 
if the government does this, it will be violating his religious beliefs.” Does his refusal “trigger’ 
drafting that replacement such that RFRA “would require a draft exemption for both the Quaker 
and his non-Quaker replacement”? 137  Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner noted that 
counsel for Notre Dame said that “drafting a replacement indeed would substantially burden the 
Quaker’s religion,” but that it was a “fantastic” suggestion.138 Sotomayor explains that “the 
obligation to provide contraceptive services, like the obligation to serve in the Armed Forces, 
arises not from the filing of the form but from the underlying law and regulations.” Thus, 
Wheaton’s religious rights are not substantially burdened by larger requirements that someone 
provide contraceptive coverage for its employees and students. Wheaton may object to a third 
party providing contraceptives to them, but the ACA requires that “some entity provide 
contraceptive coverage.” Therefore, such provision “would not result from any action by 
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Wheaton.”  The dissent reasons: “A religious nonprofit’s choice not to be that entity may leave 
someone else obligated to provide coverage instead – but the obligation is created by the 
contraceptive coverage mandate imposed by law, not by the religious nonprofit’s choice to opt 
out of it.”139  
Moreover, as the circuit courts have elaborated, ACA’s process “fastidiously relieves” 
objecting religious nonprofits from contraceptive provision and disassociates them from such 
provision.
140
 The circuit circuits emphasize that “[r]eligious objectors do not suffer substantial 
burdens under RFRA where the only harm to them is that they sincerely feel aggrieved by their 
inability to prevent what other people would do to fulfill regulatory objectives after they opt 
out.”141 As the Seventh Circuit put it, “at bottom,” what religious nonprofits object to is 
Congress’s passing of ACA and the contraceptive mandate; however, under RFRA, they “have 
no right to ‘require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with 
the religious beliefs of particular citizens’” or to “prevent other institutions, whether the 
government or a health insurance company,” from engaging in acts they find offensive.142 
Arguably, under a Dworkinian frame of ethical independence, the conscience rights and 
ethical independence of Wheaton College and similar religious nonprofits cannot be analyzed in 
a vacuum: ACA accommodates them with a minimally burdensome requirement of filling out a 
one-page form,
143
 while also protecting the ethical independence and reproductive health of 
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female students and employees. To find the accommodation itself too burdensome puts in 
jeopardy ACA’s objectives and the rights of those women to receive essential reproductive 
health care. Justice Ginsburg’s Hobby Lobby dissent emphasized the importance of these rights. 
Drawing on the legislative record, the federal appellate courts elaborate on how cost-free, 
“seamless contraceptive coverage” furthered government’s compelling twin interests in public 
health and women’s wellbeing. By contrast, evidence suggests that “contraceptive use is highly 
vulnerable to even seemingly minor obstacles,” and so alternatives to ACA’s “seamless” 
accommodation process that imposed costs and delays could hinder women’s contraceptive 
access.
144
 Given high rates of unintended pregnancies, as one circuit court put it, “Permitting 
women to control the timing and spacing of their pregnancies improves the health and welfare of 
women, children, and infants.”145  
Dworkin did not write about the contraceptive mandate, but, after the Court upheld most 
of ACA, he observed that the United States “has finally satisfied a fundamental requirement of 
political decency that every other mature democracy has met long ago.”146  Recall that Religion 
Without God lists promoting the general welfare as a reason that government may restrict 
freedom. Almost assuredly, given his prior writing both on health care and on women’s 
reproductive liberty, Dworkin would have found that a compelling part of that general welfare 
was ensuring women’s access to preventive health care with respect to their reproductive lives. 
To invoke a classic Dworkinian idea, the legislative record and the jurisprudence on the 
contraceptive mandate demonstrate that, given the previous gaps in the health care system and 
the disproportionate burdens women experienced under that system, for government to treat 
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women as equals with respect to mandating the provision of preventive health care, that 
preventive health care must meet women’s distinctive health care needs.147 
At this writing, numerous challenges brought to nonprofit religious institutions (including 
Wheaton College) are making their way through the federal courts. Although the Supreme Court 
has not yet accepted such a case for review, it seems likely that it will do so eventually. Perhaps 
Hobby Lobby will also encourage more for-profit corporations to challenge ACA as well. And, 
so, the Court’s religion jurisprudence will continue to evolve. As that happens, Religion Without 
God’s argument for a new approach in that jurisprudence, along with the larger body of 
Dworkin’s work, will continue to be instructive. 
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